T his paper studies a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer facing price-and leadtime-sensitive demands. A Stackelberg game is constructed to analyze the price and lead time decisions by the supplier as the leader and the retailer as the follower. The equilibrium strategies of the two players are obtained. Using the performance of the corresponding centralized system as a benchmark, we show that decentralized decisions in general are inefficient and lead to inferior performance due to the double marginalization effect. However, further analysis shows that the decision inefficiency is strongly influenced by market and operational factors, and if the operational factors are dominating, it may not be significant. This shows that before pursuing a coordination strategy with retailers, a supplier should first improve his or her own internal operations.
Introduction
This paper studies pricing and lead time decisions of a decentralized supply chain (DSC) consisting of two firms: a supplier (or a manufacturer) and a retailer (or a distributor). The competitiveness of this supply chain is shaped by decisions made by both firms, in particular, when the market is both price-and leadtime-sensitive. Obviously, how these two firms make decisions in their own interests, how market and operational factors affect their decisions and hence the supply chain performance, and whether their decisions should and can be coordinated to achieve a systemwide goal are interesting and important issues for supply chain management.
These issues are common in practical supply chains. For example, in Internet retailing, an online purchasing transaction is made when the price and the promised delivery lead time (PDL) (which is also often referred to as quoted lead time or planned lead time in the literature) offered by the e-retailers are acceptable to a customer. After an order is confirmed, the e-retailer "assembles/configures" the order and passes it to a logistics service provider, such as UPS or the postal service, who ships the ordered product to the customer. Because a key element of website trust is the commitment to order fulfillment, PDL represents a powerful tool to build customers' trust for e-retailers (Urban et al. 2000) . This is why many e-retailers, such as Amazon.com, BestBuy.com, and Walmart.com, offer competitive PDLs (Maltz et al. 2004 ). In the furniture business, customers who want custom-built furniture usually visit a few furniture shops to check out styles, prices, and PDL. A furniture shop may have some models on display, but mainly uses photos of past projects and material samples to show what is available. When the general style, price, and PDL are acceptable, a customer will discuss with the shop the detailed design and choose the materials and colors from the available samples. When a sale is closed, the furniture shop places an order with its supplier (in Hong Kong, the supplier is usually a factory located in Guangdong province). When an order is received, the supplier customizes or configures the semifinished products and components according to the order and ships the completed product to the furniture shop's warehouse or to the customer's home directly for installation. Although each order of furniture is characterized by individual specifications, the retail price is mainly based on the materials used and the width or size of the furniture. Furthermore, in the furniture shops, salespersons usually are not authorized to negotiate with customers. Thus, it is a common practice for the shops to have their standard price and PDL quotation lists.
In fact, making an explicit commitment in PDL has become an important marketing strategy for many firms. Cat Logistics, a Caterpillar subsidiary and a key party in Caterpillar's service part supply chain, promises to ship service parts in less than 24 hours to its clients (Schmidt and Aschkenase 2004) . It is easy to see that a strong service commitment boosts a company's long-term goal and customers' loyalty. As the President and CEO of Saia (part of SCS Transportation), Rick O'Dell said, "with our Xtreme Guarantee (for guaranteed timely shipments), Saia continues on its path of providing customers with all they need in an LTL (less-than-truckload) shipping partner. We expect to generate growth and enhance customer loyalty from this new product offering" (http://www.truckertrucker.com/TruckingJobs/1086.html). The above examples exhibit some features common to many DSCs: (1) The supplier and the retailer may be independent companies and have different degrees of access to information on demands and internal operations; (2) The retailer focuses on marketing while the supplier focuses on operations; (3) Standard price and PDL are offered to customers, although their orders may differ in a number of dimensions; and (4) The demands are affected by price and PDL.
The decisions and the competitiveness of a DSC are strongly affected by realized delivery lead time (RDL), which is the actual time from the epoch when an order is confirmed to the epoch when the order is completed and can be delivered to the retailer's warehouse or to the customer's location (it is also referred to as response time or cycle time). Because of various uncertainties in the system, the RDL of a customer order is usually random and may deviate from the PDL. For example, an e-retailer's PDL could be seven days, but the RDL may be much longer when the product is out of stock due to an unexpectedly high demand. There are consequences when the RDL deviates from the PDL. Normally, they can be represented by holding and tardiness penalty costs. By including these costs in the model, we make a direct connection between operations and marketing. The unique feature of our work is to examine the interaction between the RDL and PDL closely, and demonstrate its strong impact on the decisions and on the performance in a DSC.
We formulate a leader-follower game model, with the supplier as the leader, determining the PDL and the wholesale price first, and the retailer as the follower, quoting to customers the retail price as well as the PDL determined by the supplier (such as in the furniture example, although the retailer may be more important in determining the PDL in, say, the e-retailing example). Assuming each player maximizes his or her profit rate, we obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium of wholesale price, PDL, and retail price. Using the performance of a corresponding centralized supply chain (CSC) as a benchmark, we show that the decentralized decisions are inefficient and lead to suboptimal performance. We further examine the performance gap between the DSC and CSC and reveal that when the operation of the supplier is not efficient or there are some unfavorable market conditions, the performance gap may be much smaller and the benefits of coordination may not be significant. This shows that the interactions among agency effects, market factors, and operational factors are important to the performance of a supply chain and must be considered systematically.
The importance of product delivery lead time to the competitiveness of a firm has been recognized in practice and literature for quite some time. From an internal operations perspective, Yano is one of the first authors to treat delivery lead time as a decision variable (Yano 1987a, b, c) . The author studies how to determine planned lead times for a fixed batch size in a two-stage serial/distribution system, and two components in a two-stage assembly system, respectively, under stochastic procurement lead times so that the total expected holding and tardiness costs is minimized. Hopp and Spearman (1993) consider how to set safety delivery lead times for multiple components with random procurement times and deterministic assembly times. Song et al. (2000) extend Yano's (1987b) results. The authors focus on decisions on when to order each of the n components which have independent random procurement times and are needed for assembling an end product with a prespecified due date in a two-stage assembly system.
To investigate the interactions between operations and marketing, many researchers have considered how customers react to an expected delivery lead time or to a PDL. Li (1992) explores the role of inventory when firms compete on delivery speed and the impact of this competition on a firm's optimal choice between make-to-order (MTO) and make-tostock (MTS) strategies. Li and Lee (1994) analyze the price competition between two firms with lead-timesensitive customers, who make their choices of suppliers on arrival. Lederer and Li (1997) develop an analytical model that captures the effect of lead time performance on prices, demands, and companies' profits. Cachon and Harker (2002) demonstrate how economies of scale motivate outsourcing in a two-firm competitive setting facing a price-and time-sensitive market. A core assumption in the above works is that when making a purchasing decision, a customer uses his or her past experience on waiting times. In our model, a customer is offered a PDL and the protection for any deviation from it. Because the supplier in our model is responsible for the deviation from the PDL, the actual delivery lead time needs to be explicitly considered by the supplier when making the PDL and pricing decision while in the above works, only the expected lead time is considered when making the price decision. Finally, in the above models, different firms compete in the same market segment, whereas we consider the decisions of a supplier and a retailer in the same DSC. Palaka et al. (1998) and So and Song (1998) study the optimal selection of price and delivery time (which is uniformly applied to all customers' orders) so as to maximize the profit of an M/M/1-type MTO system. So (2000) extends the work to multiple firms and derives the equilibrium solution. Boyaci and Ray (2003) examine price, lead time, and capacity decisions of two substitutable products for a firm with price-and time-sensitive demands. In these papers, a static PDL is used as a decision variable that affects demands directly like the price. This is similar to our work. However, these papers consider either a single decision maker or multiple decision makers at the same level of a supply chain, while we consider two independent decision makers at two levels in a DSC and provide a more in-depth study of the system performance under different decision scenarios.
There is a significant body of literature on DSCs and incentive schemes for channel coordination. This paper does not deal directly with the contract and coordination issue. Interested readers can refer to a recent comprehensive review by Cachon (2003) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In §2, we formulate the decentralized decision models for the retailer and the supplier, respectively, who optimize their individual profit functions. In §3, we propose a general RDL model and provide the Stackelberg equilibrium analysis. We also discuss briefly the supplier's capacity decision in the DSC. In §4, we examine the performance of the DSC in detail using a corresponding CSC as a benchmark. While the DSC in general performs worse, the performance gap is shown to depend on the market and operational factors. In §5, we summarize the paper and point out some potential directions for further research.
Decision Models
Consider a decentralized supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. Upon receiving an order from the retailer, the supplier completes the finished product and delivers it to the retailer (or to the customer directly on behalf of the retailer). The product is not unique in the market and potential customers for the product are sensitive to both price and PDL. This requires the supply chain to offer a competitive retail price and PDL. On the other hand, as the capacity of the supplier is finite and cannot be changed quickly, higher demands may cause longer customer RDL and late delivery. When this occurs, customers must be compensated. In practice, there are different ways to compensate affected customers. For instance, a discount or partial refund can be offered if a customer is willing to wait. Expedited delivery, e.g., airfreight instead of ocean shipping, can also be used without additional charge to the customer. Here, we assume that customers' additional waiting cost and inconvenience from late delivery will be covered exactly by the supplier with a generic penalty cost per unit per unit time late, and thus the possible delivery delay and the associated compensation are known to the customer but they do not affect the customer's purchasing decision.
As independent decision makers, the supplier and the retailer make their own decisions aimed at maximizing their individual profit rates. The supplier knows his or her production facility and how quickly he or she can respond to customer orders. Naturally then, the supplier should determine the PDL to be quoted to customers in addition to the wholesale price. In making these decisions, the supplier will also be fully responsible for any late delivery penalties. In response to the supplier's price and PDL decisions, the retailer determines the best retail price so that the retailer's own profit rate is maximized. Because the retail price together with the PDL will affect the level of demands and thus the supplier's operation cost and profit, the supplier must consider the reaction of the retailer when making his or her decisions. Thus, the two members of the supply chain interact in a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader and the retailer as the follower. We assume that the supplier shares with the retailer the RDL information fully and is informed by the retailer about how customers will react to the PDL and retail price. End customers also play a role in the decision process in which their independent decisions collectively define the demand level corresponding to the quoted retail price and PDL.
In the furniture example, when a customer selects the surface material for a piece of furniture, the retailer usually quotes a PDL (determined by the supplier) and a price from a standard list. The pricing in this case is usually measured per foot of the width of the furniture (when the size of the furniture is measured by the width). A transaction is successful if the price and PDL are acceptable to the customer. Similar scenarios exist in many other retail markets where a predefined set of customizations (options) are available at standard prices. Obviously, although there may be some flexibility in price or lead time, the stores and their suppliers need to determine their standard quotations, which is the focus in this study.
Customers are different, either in their waiting costs or in the utilities they obtain from the product. Here we distinguish them by the utility. Thus, the decision makers do not need to treat customers differently when determining the (standard) price and PDL and, for the supply chain, there is a single class of customers. Potential customers become actual customers if and only if their own individual expected utilities for the product are greater than or equal to the cost of acquiring the product, assuming a rational buying behavior. Let p r be the retail price and c w be a standard waiting cost per unit of PDL, denoted by , to customers. Then, a customer will purchase only if his or her expected utility is greater than or equal to p r + c w . In other words, this cost equals the smallest expected utility of all realized customers. Let be the (realized) demand rate, i.e., the number of realized purchases in unit time, and V be the expected total social value of satisfying customers per unit time. In equilibrium, the expected marginal social value dV /d equals the expected utility of the marginal customer, which should be equal to the total cost incurred by this customer. We then have
Here, p r + c w is equivalent to the customer's reservation utility. Assume that the utility of individual customers follows a uniform distribution. The value function is then a quadratic function, i.e., V = 1 − 2 2 with 1 2 > 0 ( Mendelson and Whang 1990, Stidham 1992) . We obtain the following demand model from (1):
where 0 = 1 / 2 2 is the market potential, = 1/ 2 2 > 0 is the price sensitivity factor, and = c w / 2 2 > 0 is the PDL sensitivity factor. Note that c w = / . The supplier's operating cost includes the holding cost of finished goods when an order is completed earlier than the PDL and the penalty cost when an order is tardy. Let b s be the tardiness cost per unit per unit time and h be the holding cost per unit per unit time. Let R be the distribution function of the RDL for a given demand rate . Then,
is the supplier's expected "lead time cost. 
For any 0 , , and , and any given p s and , the retail price p r is bounded (the right-hand side of (2) must be positive), i.e.,
where p max r = 0 / is the maximum feasible retail price. Thus, we assume throughout the paper that (6) holds. It can be shown later that the optimal solution satisfies this condition. Also, for practical systems, we should have b s > h ≥ 0.
The Stackelberg Equilibrium
In this section, we present the retailer's best response to the supplier's decisions and determine the supplier's PDL strategy. We then propose two different RDL models and present the corresponding equilibrium strategies of the two players under each model. At the end of this section, we provide a brief discussion of the supplier's capacity decision in the DSC.
Retailer's Best Response
The retailer's best response for the supplier's and p s is given in the following lemma. The proof of this lemma as well as all the other proofs in this paper are given in the appendix. 
We use a sequential solution procedure (which can be shown to be valid for our problem) to solve (9): for a given , we first obtain * as a function of ; we then substitute * into s and change the supplier's decision problem to a single-variable problem
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For a fixed , the supplier's best PDL is uniquely given by
where R −1 is the inverse of the RDL distribution function R . Remark 1. Equation (11) is similar to the optimal order quantity formula in the standard newsvendor problem, with the demand distribution being replaced by the RDL distribution. b s − c w / h + b s is also a reflection of the cost structure. Moreover, if the supplier's tardiness cost is less than the customers' waiting cost, i.e., b s ≤ c w , then it is optimal for the supplier to always quote a zero lead time regardless of the demand rate. Thus, we assume that b s > c w to exclude this trivial solution.
The RDL Models
It is usually very difficult to derive the RDL distribution for a real supply chain. Even though for some simple systems we can derive the exact RDL distributions, they would be too complicated to be useful in our optimization. Because we focus on understanding the impact of the pricing decision by the retailer and the PDL decision by the supplier on the RDL through the demand rate, we assume that there exists an inherent (uncapacitated or the RDL without any waiting) RDL X and propose two models to modify this X so as to characterize the actual system RDL Y .
Let
and denote the density function and distribution function of X, respectively. Assuming no workload influence, then, by Lemma 2, the supplier should quote¯
We note that¯ depends on the system cost structure and the property of the inherent RDL, but is independent of the external demands. We call¯ the system's configuration lead time.
Suppose that X is the exponential service time of a single-server queue with a service rate . Assume further that the demand process is Poisson with rate . (Note that we have so far not made any assumptions on the demand process.) Then, naturally, Y is the steady-state customer sojourn time in the M/M/1 queue. From standard queueing results (e.g., Wolff 1989), we have
It is also easy to see that, when X is exponential with distribution 
Remark 2. Equation (14) has an interesting interpretation: On one hand (see the first equality), we can view * as a product of two terms: − −1 , the average RDL, and a function of the critical ratio (called the safety factor). In this case, the cost structure of the system will determine whether the supplier quotes a longer or shorter PDL than the average RDL. On the other hand (see the last equality), PDL can also be treated as the product of the system configuration lead time and the average number of outstanding orders plus one. The configuration lead time is the product of the expected service time 1/ and the safety factor. These interpretations have some intriguing implications: (i) The configuration lead time is associated with a single outstanding order, i.e., it is the PDL we quote to an order when no other order is on hand. This shows that the configuration lead time is the key in determining the PDL; (ii) While Remark 1 suggests a similarity in the format of the decision criteria, (14) is different from the commonly used order quantity criterion, which often calls for the average demand plus a safety stock. The product form of (14) is likely a direct result of the RDL model which, as will be shown later, is a special case of the multiplicative model. Furthermore, we note that * will never be smaller than¯ .
The M/M/1 RDL has been often used in the supply chain literature, see, e.g., So (2000) . It provides a good approximation of light-tailed waiting times (Boyaci and Ray 2003) . On the other hand, there are obvious limitations for this model due to the restrictive requirements on X. To overcome this limitation, we model Y directly as follows:
where g 1 and g 2 are two nonnegative and increasing convex functions of . Applying (15) to (11), we have
Setting g 2 = 0, the demand rate only changes the scale of the RDL. We call this simplified version the multiplicative model. Here, the coefficient of variation of Y remains constant for any demand rate. When g 1 = 1, the demand rate only shifts the position of the response time and the simplified model is called the additive model, with a constant variance for any demand rate. In general, both the scale and the location parameters of the RDL are affected by the demand rate, and we call (15) the combination model. We also note from (16) the one-to-one correspondence between and .
Remark 3. The GI/M/1 queue is a multiplicative model with g 1 = / 1 − , where is defined in Wolff (1989, p. 396) , and = / when the arrival process is Poisson. We may also use the combination model to approximate the RDL distribution in an M/G/1 queue. Let X and Y represent the service time and the sojourn time in this queue, respectively. Then, for a two-moment approximation (E · and V · represent the mean and variance of a random variable, respectively), the two functions in the combination model are
where E Y and V Y can be obtained by the Pollaczek-Khintchine Formula given by Wolff (1989, p. 386) . This approximation works well in our extensive numerical tests. For example, for M/E 2 /1, the approximation error decreases in the probability that the RDL is not greater than the PDL. In particular, the error is smaller than 2.5% when the probability is above 85%, where the error is defined as the maximum of the percentage differences between the approximate and exact cumulative distribution functions. Equation (17) also suggests that g 1 may be seen as the demand-induced RDL variability.
The Stackelberg Equilibrium
Substituting the supplier's optimal PDL (16) into (9), we obtain
Denote f x = df x /dx and f x = d 2 f x /dx 2 . We have the following lemma and theorem. 
The optimal profit rates of the retailer and the supplier are now given, respectively, by 
Note that although (21) has three possible roots, only one of them is positive and real because s is concave in and the uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed. The unique real root of the cubic equation can be computed using the formulas provided in Spiegel and Liu (1999, p. 10) .
The Capacity Decision
Based on the above analysis for the combination model, we see that the supplier's maximal profit rate is a function of the service rate. Thus, if the supplier can anticipate how the PDL and price decisions will be made in the future, the supplier may choose an optimal service rate so that the future profit is maximized. We use the M/M/1 model as an example to illustrate this sequential decision process. Let the capacity cost rate be increasing convex in . Let * be the optimal demand rate chosen in the Stackelberg game for a given capacity . Then, the optimal profit rate for the supplier without considering the capacity cost is given by (23). Making the capacity a decision variable and adding the capacity cost, the supplier's objective function is then * s
where, by (21) 
The Decision Inefficiency
In this section, we examine the performance of the DSC. In particular, we use the performance of a corresponding CSC as a benchmark to examine the decentralized decisions. We also investigate the impacts of the market factors, and , and the operational factors, g 1 and g 2 , on the decision inefficiency (to be defined later).
Performance Analysis
We consider a CSC with a single decision maker and with the same cost structure as that of the DSC. The wholesale price, as an internal transfer in the CSC, is not considered. For convenience, we use a subscript c or d to indicate a centralized system or a decentralized system whenever necessary, for example, p rc and c are the retail price and PDL for the CSC. 
Here, c is still concave in c for a given c and, by (11) and (15), the optimal PDL is again
Observing the solutions for both centralized and decentralized systems, we find that the prices increase in C ¯ , while the PDL and demand rate decreases in C ¯ . However, the extents of the increase and decrease are different, and this leads to different systemwide profit rates. To examine this issue, we define *
Theorem 2 shows that for a market with characteristics as defined here, the desirable strategy for a centralized supply chain is to use a lower price to capture a higher market share and a longer PDL to accommodate the higher demand rate while maintaining the same service level (the probability of on-time delivery). In a decentralized setting, independent players deviate from this strategy, resulting in a lower systemwide profit. This phenomenon is the result of myopic behavior known as double marginalization (e.g., Spengler 1950 and Lee et al. 2000) . Table 1 DSC is higher than that of the CSC, the systemwide profit rate is more than 20% less than that of the supply chain under centralized decisions. The performance gap between the DSC and the CSC systems is obvious. Remark 4. The centralized strategy of a lower retail price and a longer PDL is intuitive when customers are more price sensitive. However, when > , it seems more effective to use a shorter PDL to achieve * c while charging a higher price. Upon further reflection, one realizes that decreasing the PDL to increase market share may be counter-productive because it increases the costs incurred due to tardiness. Figure 1 shows the changes of the profit rate with respect to with a fixed under two scenarios: the circles represent the optimal profit rates in the CSC; the triangles represent the profit rates generated by a PDL = * d /2 with a corresponding retail price that yields * c . The parameters are the same as in Table 1 except = 1, h = 0 2, and b s = 2 4. We observe that using a smaller PDL to increase the market share to * c always leads to lower profit rates. Only in the extreme case when = c w → b s = 2 4, are the two profit rates equal. bounded by 25% or 50%? These percentages can be attributed primarily to the specific market condition, i.e., the quadratic expected total value function. This shows that for any given market and system conditions, it is only economical for a supply chain to capture a certain market share.
The Inefficiencies
The performance gap examined above is entirely a result of the decentralized decisions as all the system parameters and market conditions are identical for the DSC and CSC. At the same time, the extent of the performance gap may differ under different system settings and we are interested in precisely how the performance gap is affected by different market and operational factors. Assume that the centralized decision is completely efficient, or the efficiency of the centralized decision is one. To measure the efficiency or, more properly, the inefficiency of the decentralized decisions, we treat the optimal performance of the CSC as the benchmark and define
as the decision inefficiency of the DSC. Note that the decision inefficiency of the CSC is zero. We note here that in discussing a revenue-sharing contract between a retailer and a supplier in a DSC, Wang et al. (2004) perform a similar analysis of performance gaps between a DSC and a CSC, where the two decisions are the retail price and production quantity. For an additive model (which we call Model A) with g 1 = 1 and g 2 = with > 0, the decision inefficiency of the DSC is
We observe that q is unimodal in and (i) the maximum decision inefficiency is 0.282, reached at = 0 732, and (ii) it vanishes as → (e.g., q reaches 0.004 when = 500 . Substituting g 1 = 1 and g 2 = into (2), we can rewrite the demand function as = 0 − p r − ¯ / 1 + . Treating as a scaling factor, we may say that the quoted PDL, according to (16), affects the demand rate only through the configuration lead time¯ directly; however the realized demand rate will be scaled down by 1 + . In other words, for additive demands, is an indiscriminant scaler that scales down the market potential and the (negative) effects of the price and lead time by the same proportion. For a multiplicative model (which we call Model M) with g 1 = 2 and g 2 = 0 with > 0, we have
where u = 0 − c r + c s and l = C ¯ + ¯ . Note that u is an upper bound of the realized demand rate of the supply chain, i.e., the maximum market share when = 0 and p r = c r + c s , while l can be seen as the minimum loss of potential demand rate, noting that C ¯ represents the minimum delivery cost rate that the quoted price must cover. It is easy to show that q is decreasing in u l and it vanishes as u l → (e.g., q reaches 0.001 when u l = 500 , or more specifically, as → because u ≤ 0 and l is finite. This is similar to the additive model case. On the other hand, when the market size is very small, and or the market is extremely price sensitive, and or c r and c s are very large, the decision inefficiency may be the largest. In fact, we can show that as u → 0, q → 0 25, which is the theoretical maximum decision inefficiency.
Setting * c as the benchmark, we can also define decision inefficiency with respect to the market share, q = 1 − * d / * c , and call it the decision inefficiency in market share (DIMS). For the additive and multiplicative models, respectively, we have
The above discussion shows that given a supply chain system, the inefficiency of decentralized decision may fall in a range from 0 to 0.25 or higher. Thus, while active coordination can eliminate the inefficiency, the potential gain varies significantly. Furthermore, while both the RDL model and the sensitivity factors and affect the decision inefficiency strongly, the ways they impact the decision inefficiency may be different. We need to examine further how different factors affect the decision inefficiency in a DSC.
The Impact of Market Factors
This section examines how the price sensitivity factor and lead time sensitivity factor affect the decision inefficiency.
Let the RDL be given by Model E with the parameter setting identical to that given in Table 1 except h = 0 5, b s = 3, and 0 = 20. Figure 2 shows that the price sensitivity factor has a significant impact on the decision inefficiency q under different values. The impact on q is similar. We omit the related figure. Both decision inefficiencies increase in . In particular, when → 0 / c r + c s , its upper bound, q → 0 5 and q → 0 25. However, as indicated in Figure 3 (a similar figure for q is omitted here), both q and q are insensitive to the change of under different settings of . (30) and (32) that both q and q are independent of . This would be a very unexpected phenomenon. However, if we treat e = / 1+ (see the demand function given below (30)) as the effective price sensitivity factor and substitute = / e − 1 into (30) and (32), we see that q is still increasing in e , while q is unimodal in e .
For the multiplicative Model M, it can be shown that u l is concave in for a fixed . Hence, both q and q are quasiconvex in . The minimum decision inefficiency can be found by solving the following first-order condition for : For example, using the same parameters as those used for Table 1 and = 0 5, we can show that the minimum decision inefficiency is 0.167 at = 0 591.
In summary, the market factor , in general, has a strong impact on the decision inefficiency of a DSC. Depending on the RDL type, the decision inefficiency in a supply chain changes with the according to certain patterns. We can usually identify the range of values of within which there is a significant decision inefficiency in a DSC and decision coordination can be highly profitable to the supply chain. The impact of is not as strong. On the other hand, the optimal PDL is strongly affected by . For example, when customers are highly sensitive to the PDL, i.e., when → b s , it may be optimal to quote a near-zero PDL according to (12) and (14).
The Impact of Operational Factors
Consider the additive Model A again. Both q and q decrease in sharply as shown in Figure 4 . This is con- (31) and (33) we show in Figure 5 that both q and q are decreasing in for fixed and . Similarly, when → , q → 0 and q → 0. Consider Model E with = = 0 8, h = 0 1, and b s = 1 2, and with other parameters being the same as given in §4.1. Plotting the numerical results in Figure 6 , we observe that when 1/ is around 0.15 and 0.2, the inefficiencies start to drop rapidly with 1/ . Specifically, it can be shown that 0 032 < q < 0 25 and 0 115 < q < 0 50.
We have examined other types of g 1 functions numerically and found that while the exact impacts of different multiplicative factors differ, the overall effects are similar: the decision inefficiency declines rapidly with an increase of the multiplicative factor.
The operational factors and represent the coefficients of inflexibility of the supplier's operations to the change of the demand rate, while represents the supplier's capacity. Thus, we may conclude that there may be little to gain from coordinating the decisions in a decentralized supply chain if the supplier's operation is highly inflexible (inefficient). On the other hand, if the supplier has a relatively large capacity, coordination should be encouraged to capture a larger market share and hence a high profit rate.
Conclusion and Extensions
We have studied a two-firm DSC in which independent players make decisions about prices and the PDL, knowing that their decisions will affect the demand rate, which in turn will affect their internal operations. Fluctuations in the RDL affect the delivery time service performance, hence the PDL decision is intimately related to the pricing decision; together they affect the profitability of the firms and the supply chain. Formulating the decentralized decision problem as a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader, we have obtained the unique equilibrium analytically and provided exact formulas to compute the optimal prices and PDL.
It is not too difficult to show that the performance of the DSC is usually poorer than that of the corresponding CSC. We propose decision inefficiency as a quantitative measure of the performance gap between the DSC and CSC because such a gap is entirely the result of inefficient decisions in the DSC under the double marginalization effect. Our construction of the demand model and the RDL model enables us to reveal the impact of those factors on the decision inefficiency in a DSC: the market factors characterized by and , and the operational factors characterized by g 1 and g 2 . The standard supply chain coordination mechanisms are generally aimed at eliminating the decision inefficiency (or the double marginalization effect). However, we find that under some combinations of market and operational factors, the performance gap between the DSC and the CSC can be very small, and hence coordination may not be too meaningful. Thus, an important lesson from our analysis is that supply chain excellence must be built on each supply chain member's internal operational excellence, and individual member's operation (e.g., capacity) design must be aligned with the overall supply chain needs. Our finding is similar to a conclusion drawn by Tagaras and Lee (1996) , who study quality issues in the procurement process between a supplier and a manufacturer. They point out that in making decisions about supplier selections and evaluations, it is necessary to consider the performance and capabilities of the internal manufacturing process. We have also demonstrated that internal operational efficiency is also essential for reaping the benefits of the coordination between a manufacturer and a retailer. Combining our observations with those of Tagaras and Lee (1996) , we may conclude that a manufacturer, as a key middle link in a supply chain, has to enhance his or her internal operational efficiency to guarantee a high-quality procurement process with the upstream suppliers and to achieve successful coordination with the downstream retailers.
With our characterization of the RDL, we also discover that, with a finite capacity and the RDL dynamics, the PDL quotation strategy depends to a large extent on the type of the RDL distribution. The widely used "mean demand plus safety quantity" formula for inventory control has often been borrowed to make lead time decisions. However, such a form is appropriate only when the RDL follows a pure additive model. For a pure multiplicative RDL model, we should use a (mean) × (safety factor) formula.
In general, we should use PDL = (safety factor) × (mean RDL) + (safety RDL). Such standard formulas expressed in terms of system parameters should be very useful for PDL quotation in practice and should be explored further.
Our discussion in §4 illustrates that when the decision inefficiency in a DSC is quite significant, channel coordination will be very profitable. Therefore, the partners in a DSC should have a strong incentive to design a decision coordination mechanism to eliminate the decision inefficiency. Different coordination mechanisms have been proposed in the supply chain literature for price and inventory decisions. Some of the mechanisms can be borrowed here. For instance, a two-part tariff contract or a revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the price and PDL decisions in a DSC. However, implementation of these contracts is not easy because neither contract provides a mechanism to divide the gain from coordination rationally. From our analysis (not included here), we find that a contract with contingent rebate is not feasible for our problem. We believe that while supply chain coordination is a well-researched area for price and inventory decisions, how to coordinate price and PDL decisions in DSC is an area that deserves more research.
We assume that the cost parameters are common knowledge. In practice, they are often guarded private information. We must then make decisions under asymmetric information and may need to design a scheme to induce a supply chain partner to reveal his or her private information. Further research is needed to investigate these issues.
